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Synthese special issue on Truth and Epistemic Norms 
Introduction 
Julien Dutant, Davide Fassio and Anne Meylan1 
 
On his 60th birthday Pascal Engel was presented with a collection of more than fifty papers authored by 
prestigious philosophers that reflected his long career of promotion and development of analytic philosophy 
in and out of Europe.2 This special issue brings together a selection of those papers centred around the 
topics of truth and epistemic norms, along with Pascal Engel’s replies.  
 
Normative questions in epistemology have been a longstanding focus of Pascal Engel’s research (see e.g. 
Engel 1991, Engel and Rorty 2007). A central question has been whether and in what sense truth is a norm 
for belief (Engel 2005, 2013a, 2013b, 2013c). A parallel question arises for assertion and inquiry (Engel 2008). 
Three of the collection’s papers deal with these issues. In “Engel vs. Rorty on Truth”, Erick Olsson’s focuses 
on whether rational inquiry aims at truth. The article critically assesses the debate opposing Engel and Rorty 
in their co-authored book ‘What’s the Use of Truth?’. Olsson sides with Engel in maintaining that truth plays a 
distinct conceptual role in our intellectual lives. Drawing on a general theory of rational goal-setting which has 
its roots in management science, he argues that Rorty's central claim that truth is not something we should 
aim for over and beyond justification rests on a principle of goal-setting rationality that is generally invalid. 
Olsson concludes by stressing that the goal of truth is likely to have the positive effect of increasing motivation 
and effort in inquiry, and that this may offset the drawbacks that Rorty calls attention to. In “Engel on Doxastic 
Correctness”, Conor McHugh raises two worries for Pascal Engel’s views on the norms for belief. The first 
concerns Engel’s distinction between two types of correctness: i-correctness and e-correctness. According to 
Engel, a belief is e-correct if and only if it is true, and it is i-incorrect when it is held for bad reasons, on the 
basis of insufficient evidence. Together, these two types of correctness constitute an overarching correctness 
property possessed by beliefs. McHugh challenges the idea that beliefs’ i-correctness is a genuine kind of 
doxastic correctness. Amongst other things, he observes that a belief is deemed to be correct even when it is 
not i-correct, that it seems odd to think of appropriate basing as a form of correctness at all, and that i-
correctness and e-correctness are not reciprocally independent properties. The second worry concerns 
Engel’s view about the specific type of normativity involved in doxastic correctness. According to Engel, 
doxastic correctness should not be interpreted as a deontic notion (such as a permission or a duty) but as an 
ideal of reason, belonging to the category of the ought-to-be rather than that of the ought-to-do. McHugh 
challenges Engel’s view by arguing that i) the failure to attain true belief need not be a failure of reason (viz. 
an instance of irrationality), ii) achieving ideals is normally supererogatory and failure to achieve them is not 
associated with serious criticism and blame in the way false beliefs are, iii) aiming for ideals is something that 
can be met with graded success but having correct beliefs is a categorical, non-graded matter. McHugh 
concludes by exploring an alternative approach to the nature of correctness normativity. He suggests that 
correctness is a normative property in its own right, neither deontic nor evaluative, related to the notion of 
fittingness (see further McHugh 2014). In “Engel on Knowledge and Assertion”, Adam Carter argues against 
both the assumption that knowledge is the only norm of assertion (the so-called “uniqueness hypothesis”) and 
against the view that knowledge constitutes a sufficient credential for assertion. Building on Lackey’s (2008) 
Doctor Case, Carter presents another widespread range of cases in which knowledge would not make the 
assertion appropriate. Cases of “epistemic hypocrisy” —as Carter calls them— are cases in which the target 
assertion is criticisable. What would make the epistemically hypocritical assertion appropriate is that one had 
better epistemic support than one does when one asserts.  
 
One point of entry into the question of what epistemic norms govern belief is to ask what are the epistemic 
goods, that is, what is of epistemic value. Two central issues in this are are whether knowledge has more value 
than true belief and whether the value of either is derived from their contribution to successful action. In “Engel 
on Pragmatic Encroachment and Epistemic Value”, Duncan Pritchard takes up Engel’s view on the latter 
(Engel 2009). While Pritchard agrees with Engel’s rejection of the idea that knowledge is sensitive to pragmatic 
factors, he criticizes Engel’s way of relating the pragmatic encroachment to the issues that regard epistemic 
value. According to Engel, once we grant that there is no such phenomenon as pragmatic encroachment on 
knowledge, then it follows that the kind of pragmatic factors appealed to by proponents of this view cannot 
confer any value on knowledge. Pritchard argues that this latter claim is mistaken: the kind of pragmatic factors 
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appealed to by proponents of pragmatic encroachment could potentially have a role to play in determining the 
value of knowledge without this having any bearing on whether the pragmatic encroachment applies or not. 
According to Pritchard, Engel’s mistake is to be located in the failure to observe an ambiguity between an 
attributive and a predicative interpretation of the notion of epistemic value. We can maintain that pragmatic 
factors add value to knowledge without having to accept pragmatic encroachment as long as we make it clear 
that we are talking of epistemic value in its predicative sense (the value of the epistemic as opposed to a 
distinctively epistemic kind of value). Thus, Pritchard argues, it is possible to reject pragmatic encroachment 
on knowledge while holding that pragmatic factors explain the value of knowledge. In “Commodious 
Knowledge”, Christopher Kelp and Mona Simion put forward a new account of the value of knowledge that 
builds on the idea that knowledge is useful for action. Knowledge, they argue, is like water in that it is a widely 
and readily available commodity. Like mere true beliefs or Gettierized true beliefs, knowledge is instrumentally 
good in virtue of involving a correct representation of the world. However, they argue, knowledge is superior 
because of its commodity: like water, it is readily and widely available. According to them, the superior value 
of knowledge lies precisely in its being a way of correctly representing the world that is much more readily 
available than alternative epistemic goods. 
 
The foregoing debates concern the analogue of ‘metaethics’ in epistemology and only tangentially touch upon 
the ‘first-order’ and perhaps more pressing question of what, specifically, we should believe. On ordinary 
matters, Engel has sympathies with the common sense tradition (Engel 2007). On academic matters, Engel 
has forcefully defended a rationalist ideal against various intellectual trends that “betray” it – to put it in the 
words of Julien Benda, whose legacy Engel has recently highlighted (Engel 2012). In “Common Sense and 
Skepticism”, Keith Lehrer spells out his own defense of a common sense answer to skepticism. He first 
compares the defense of common sense provided by Thomas Reid to that of G.E. Moore against the 
skepticism of David Hume. The discussion sets the stage for Lehrer’s own defense, which relies on an account 
ordinary knowledge that combines Hume’s notion of sense impressions with Reid’s insistence on the 
trustworthiness of our faculties. In “Tool-Box or Toy-Box? Hard Obscurantism in Economic Modeling?”, Jon 
Elster points out that alongside the kind of “soft obscurantist” anti-rationalist trends of academia that Engel 
denounces, there exists a kind of “hard obscurantism” in the social sciences that abuses the tools of rational 
inquiry in the “hard” sciences such as quantitative, formal, and mathematical methods. In the writing of some 
economists and political scientists, Elster claims, such tools loose their explanatory function and become 
research goals in themselves---“toys”. Elster makes his case by criticizing some representative examples.  
 
Two further papers focus on how knowledge relates to true belief and perception, respectively. In “Knowledge 
as de re true belief?”, Paul Egré discusses Kratzer (2002)’s account of knowledge as a form of de re belief of 
facts and examines how best to articulate the de re vs. de dicto distinction within this account. He shows that, 
contrary to Kratzer’s view, the distinction does not require postulating a primitive difference between facts and 
true propositions but can be fully captured in terms of mechanisms of binding and scope. Egré argues that if 
one adopts this articulation of the distinction, one can use the account to explain the original pair of Gettier 
cases. However, Egré also recognizes that the account provides at best partial truth conditions for knowledge, 
for it cannot be generalized to explain Ginet-Goldman cases of causally connected but unreliable belief, as 
well as other cases similar to Gettier’s original ones but in which it is not clear that a de re connection to a fact 
is missing. Egré also suggests that the de re belief analysis provides a way to spell out Starmans and 
Friedman’s (2012) distinction between apparent evidence and authentic evidence, which he takes to be the 
crux of the original Gettier cases. In “Knowledge, perception, and the art of camouflage”, Jérôme Dokic 
provides an original challenge to the Epistemic Conception of Perception (ECP) according to which perception 
either is a form of knowledge (Dretske 1969, Williamson 2000) or puts the subject in a position to gain 
knowledge about what is perceived (McDowell 1994, 1998). Against this view, Dokic puts forward a particular 
case in which a perceptual experience has propositional content and is veridical but fails to yield knowledge 
of the state of affairs presented by the experience. The case involves perceptual hysteresis, an empirically 
well-studied phenomenon involving the maintenance of a perceptual experience with a relatively stable content 
over progressively degrading sensory stimulations. In such cases, Dokic argues, the boundary between the 
experience being veridical and it being non-veridical does not coincide with the boundary between knowledge 
and ignorance. Dokic concludes by addressing three possible rejoinders by the defenders of ECP.  
 
The nature of truth itself has been one of Engel’s main research topics (e.g. Engel 1991). In particular, Engel 
opposes a “functionalist” account on which truth is characterized by a functional role that is realized by different 
properties in different domains (Engel 2013b). In “How to Account for the Oddness of Missing-Link 
Conditionals”, Igor Douven puts forwards a functionalist account of the truth of conditionals. His starting point 
is the perceived oddity of “missing-link” conditionals, conditionals whose antecedent and consequent lack any 
apparent connection. On the standard account the phenomenon is a pragmatic ones: roughly, the assertion of 
a conditional generates the implicature that there is an internal connection between antecedent and 
consequent, and if no such connection exists, the assertion is infelicitous (though not necessarily false). 
Douven draws on recent philosophical and psychological work to provide a semantic account instead. The 
central idea is that the connection between antecedent and consequent is a functional property, which can be 
realized by a variety of more specific, first-order relations. He focuses in particular on the “inferentialist” account 
proposed in Douven et al (2014), according to which the truth of a conditional requires the existence of a 
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